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Notes  an~ sources For the third year  in succession European  output  is rising at 2-3  per 
cent per annum.  The  problem is how  to prolong and accelerate this upswing. 
For,  despite  the  upswing,  unemployment  in  Europe  remains  stubbornly high, 
at  11  per cent  of the  workforce.  This  involves  a  huge  waste  of economic 
resources,  and  much  human  misery.  To  deal  with  it,  our  last  report 
advocated  a  I two-handed  approach  I  ,  with  supply-side  measures  being 
accompanied by demand  expansion.1  The  same  approach is still needed today. 
But  in the last year two  major changes  have  occurred Which,  if handled 
well,  can  make  the  task  a  good  deal  easier.  First,  the  price of oil has 
roughly  halved.  Just  as  the  oil  price  rises  of  the  1970s  increased 
inflation and  reduced  employment,  so  an oil price fall now  can be expected 
to  reduce  inflation  and  increase  employment.  Employment  will  increase 
slightly,  because  a  fall in .oil prices raises real  income  in the  conmaunity 
( a  net  importer of oil)  and  this  may  increase  aggregate  demand  more  than 
reduced exports to OPEC  countries reduce it. 
The  second  change  in  the  last year has  been  the  fall  in  the  value  of 
the dollar.  This  provides a  second bulwark against inflation,  by  reducing 
the  ECU  price of goods  imported  from  dollar-linked currency areas.  But it 
also  reduces  the  competitiveness  of  European  exports,  and  thus  poses  a 
threat  to  employment.  A  further  threat  to  jobs  comes  from  a  possible 
fiscal  contraction  in the u.s.  These  events  make  the  two-handed  strategy 
of expansion in Europe even more  urgent. 
The  risks  of  expansion-led  inflation  are  now  less  than  before  on  the 
score of both  the oil prices  and  the  new  ~sition of the dollar.  Thus  we 
have  two  new  grounds  for  hope,  if  the  opportunities  are  taken.  But 
expansion  still  has  many  problems.  In  our  last  two  reports  we  have 
highlighted  the  problems  arising  from  rigidity  in  the  ~abour market.  In -2-
this  report  we  focus  on  the  potential  problems  in  the  cap'£.-ta~  market. 
First,  there  is  the  risk  of  a  shortage  of  physical  capital,  as  the 
expansion  proceeds.  In Part  II we  discuss  the  size of this  problem,  and 
conclude  that,  though  it is  not  now  binding,  action  has  to  be  taken  to 
ensure  that  it does  not  become  so.  In  the  light  of this,  we  review  in 
Part III What  scale of expansion could be hoped  for and the appropriate mix 
of macroeconomic  strategies to be  adopted.  In particular we  focus  on  the 
question of how  ~proved capital  formation  would  be  financed  - in terms of 
the broad  flow of funds. 
On  top  of this,  there  is the  important  question  of  the  microeconomic 
efficiency of the  institutions of the  capital market.  In  Part  IV  we  look 
at how  this  needs  to be  improved  within  each  country,  and  in terms  of the 
international  integration  of  the  capital  markets  of  the  community 
countries.  Part v  summarises our conclusions. 
But  first  we  need  to  review  some  of the basic  features  of the  current 
European situation. -3-
I  •  SE'rl'ING  THE  SCENE 
As  Table  1  shows,  the  European  economy  has  now  recovered  from  the 
inflationary shoCks  of the  1970s  an~ the early 1980s,  an~ returned t~s 
a  level of inflation similar to that of the 1960s.  The  rate of growth  is 
still somewhat  lower than the one  observe~ 1n that  peri~, but it is on  the 
unemployment  front  that  the  present  situation  in  Europe  stan~s  out  as 
extremely  serious  in  (a)  quantity,  (b)  quality  an~  (c)  probable 
persistence: 
(a) The  rate  of  unemployment  in  Europe  is  about  five  times  as  high  as  it 
was  in 1960-73;  it is also much  greater than the  current rate  in the u.s. 
and Japan  ( see Table 1 ) . 
(b) Even if it were  not larger in size,  European  unemployment  woulO  present 
more  problems,  economically and  socially,  due to its qualitative structure. 
Youth  unemployment  and  long-term  unemployment  have  all  sUbstantially 
increased  in  the  last  few  years  and  are  much  larger  than  in the u.s.  and 
Japan  ( see Table  4;  ) • 
(c) If policies are not  significantly changed,  the unemployment  problem  in 
Europe  is  likely  to  remain  severe.  Accor~ing  the  EEC's  baseline 
projection,  the  rate  of  unemployment  in  1990  woul~  on  present  policies 
still he  as  high  as  10.4 per  cent,  almost  twice  the  u.s.  level  and  more 
than six times the Japanese  level (see Table 1). 
For this reason,  our report will focus  - like the previous one - on the 
issue  of  unemployment  in  Europe.  It will  try to  identify  a  strategy to 
increase  both  the  rate  of  growth  of output  an~ the·  employment  content  of 
growth. 
The  philosophy  underlying  our  reconunendations  is  in  line  with  the 
"two-handed"  approach advocated  last year.  we  are still convinced --4-
TABLE  1 
Inflation,  growth and  unemployment 
1961-73  1974-81  1982-85  1985  1986a  1987a  1986-9ob 
Inflation (p.a.) 
(GOP  deflator) 
E.C.  5.0  11.3  7.3  6.0  5.6  3.3  4.2 
u.s.  3.5  8.0  4.7  3.2  3.0  4.3  5.4 
Japan  5.8  6.7  2.4  1.6  0.8  0.1  3.0 
Real  GOP/GNP  Growth (p.a.) 
E.C.  4.6  1.9  1.5  2.3  2.7  2.8  2.5 
u.s.  4.2  2.3  2.4  2.2  2.5  2.7  3.0 
Japan  9.9  3.9  4.0  4.6  3.2  3.2  4.3 
unemployment  rateC 
E.C.  2.2  5.3  10.4  11.1  10.8  10.5  10.4 
u.s.  4.9  7.0  8.5  7.2  6.9  6.6  6.3 
Japan  1.3  2.0  2.6  2.6  2.9  2.9  1.7 
sources: European COJnm1ssion,  growth rates are year on year i.e. 1985 means 
1985 on 1984,  1961-73 means  1973  on 1960. 
No1;es:  ( a)  Forecast presented in April,IMay 1986  . 
(b)  Baseline projection presented in octOber  1985  as  in EUropean 
Economr  No.26,  November 1985,  p.21 ano  141. 
( o )  Average of period,  except for 1986-90  ( enCI  of perioCI ) • -5-
TABLE  2 
Youth  unemployment  an~ long-term unemployment 
EC(4)  U.S.A.  Japan 
1980  1985  1985  1985 
Youth  unemployment 
(%  rate)  1.3.6  21..9  12.5  4.7 
1979  1984  1.984  1.984 
Long  term unemployment 
(%  of total) 
6  months  an~ over  34  61  19  38 
12 months  and over  28  38  12  15 
Source:  OECD,  .E.)np~ymen~ ou~t.ook,  September 1.985. (2) 
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an~  ~evelopments of the  last year confirm this view  that neither supply 
nor  ctema.nct  measures  will  by  themselves  create  anct  sustain  employment 
growth.  Structural changes  on  the  supply  siOe  are  requirec:l  if employment 
growth is to be sustained, but a  :boost is neected  to accelerate the process. 
This boost  must  come  from  timely  supply measures,  sustainec:l  anct  validated 
by  cteman~. 
our last report  noted that high material prices,  labour costs,  capital 
deepening,  labour  market  rigi~ities,  and  deficient  demand  all share  some 
responsibility  for  the  current  employment  woes  in  Europe.  It  would  be 
ineffective to tackle only some  of these aspects of the problem.  Thus,  our 
policy  recommendations  stressed,  as  a  necessary  condition,  the  importance 
of  removing  barriers  to  entry  and  rigidities  in  the  labour  market  anCI 
allowing  for more  wage  flexibility and  more  potential wage  dispersion.  At 
the same  time  we  noted that ~easures aimeO  at those goals coulO only make  a 
graoual contribution to employment  growth.  only a  set of supply incentives 
as  OiscusseO  in our  last report  would  make  possible  the  extra  employment 
neeOeO  in Europe.  on the other hand  we  pointec:l  out  that  supply  measures, 
without  accommodating  demano  policies,  would  be  insufficient.  If firms  Oo 
not  anticipate  i.JnproveO  sales,  they  will  not  increase  capa.ci  ty  to  the 
extent  that  we  deem  necessary.  Fiscal  and  monetary  policies  should 
therefore be combined with supply measures. 
There  seems  to  be  presently  a  broao  agreement  on  the  merit  of this 
approach. 
nature.2 
Official  documents  stress  the  need  for  a  strategy  of  this 
Policy  simulations  provide  indications  of  its  possible 
effectiveness.  In  particular,  the  recent simulation  by  the  EC  Commission 
for the period 1986-90  shows  that an expansionary fiscal policy alone woulCI 
result  in  a  relatively poor  performance  of the  European  economy,  compared 
with  a  scenario of supply measures  (wage  !'ROde ration)  ano  demanCI  measures., -7-
Not  only would  the·latter option bring  lower  inflation,  lower  labour costs 
an~  small  public  deficits,  but  it  would  also  lead  to  more  significant 
improvements  in  employment  and  to  less  crowding  out  of  investment. 3  our 
call for a  two-handed strategy,  therefore,  seems to offer a  genuine way·out 
of the current difficulties. 
But  one  key  question  is:  "Will  the  expansion  of  capacity  need~ to 
restore  employment  be  forthcoming?". 4  The  investment  record  in  Europe 
since  ~980 has  been  poor,  as  Figure  l  shows.  Total  investment  is barely 
higher than  in 1980.  Industrial investment has  recover~ rather more,  but 
the  short-fall  in  the  intervening  period  is  so  large  that  the  existing 
stock of capital is still severely  depleted.  As  noted  by  the  COmmission 
"the  volume  of  investment  planned  by  firms  for  ~  986  is at the  level Which 
it would  have  reached  arithmetically if the  investment  trend  observed  in 
the  period  ~976-80  had  continued.  However,  if  the  severe  investment 
shortfall in the period 1981 to 1983 is to be made  up,  at least in part,  it 
will not  be  sufficient  for  investment to continue on this earlier  tren~ in 
the  years  ahead.  It  needs  to  continue  for  several  years  to  grow  as 
buoyantly  as  in  the  pericx1  1984-86  if  there  is  to  be  any  appreciable 
reduction in unemployment  •• . 5 -8-
\ 
FIGURE  1 
In~ustrial investment  in the EC,  an~ other macroeconomic  indicators 
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I:  I:.  IS. CAPITAL A  CONSTRAINT  ON  GROWTH  AND  EMPLOYMENT? 
l:I.l  Facts 
so  we  first ask whether anCI  to what extent growth of output in Europe 
is made  impossible,  or at least severely hindereCI,  by  i~sufficient capital. 
we  begin  by  looking  at  some  facts  relating  to  the  availability  of 
capital  is  measureCI  by  proCluctive  capacity  in  manufacturing  inClustries, 
Where  the  concept  is  relatively  well  Clefined  anCI  measures  are  reaClily 
available. 
First  we  show  in  Figure  2  the  recorCled  levels  of capital utilisation 
since 1974.  AS  can be seen,  capacity utilisation has been rising for three 
years.  It is  now  only slightly below its level  in  1979  anCI  1974  (though 
this  is  not  generating  the  normal  pressure  on  price  expectations,  Cl~e  to 
the slackness of the labour anCI  commodity markets). 
We  can  now  use the capacity utilisation figures to produce a  measure of 
capacity ( in Figure  3 ) • 
First we  graph the actual level of industrial production  (Y).  Then  we 
graph the level of capacity (C),  measureCI  as output ClivideCI  by the rate of 
capacity utilisation (CU):  c  = Y/CU.  This is the miCldle  line on the graph. 
This  approach  to  measuring  capacity  has  several  aClvantages  over 
measurements  baseCI  on  estimates of capital stock.  First,  to  est~te the 
output  which  the  existing capital  stock  can  produce  we  also have  to know 
the  capital-intensity embodieCI  in it.  This  in turn  ClepenCis  on  the  extent 
to which the  investment  Which  produce(!  the capital was  capital-widening or 
capital-deepening,  which raises further problems of estimation. 
second  our  calculations  get  rounCI  the  problem of obsolete  capacity  in 
that  they  rely  on  firms'  own  implicit  juc3gements  about  what  capacity  is 
usable.  They also circumvent problems of unmeasureCI  scrapping of -10-
FIGURE  2 
capacity utilisation in industry (per cent) 
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FIGURE  3 
Industrial ·output,  capacity,  and  full-employment capacity 
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machinery.  By  dealing  in  terms  of  proOuctive  capacity,  we  partly 
circumvent these problems. 
The  distance  between  Y  and  c  in  Figure  3  measures  the  level  of 
underutilisation of existing capacity.  As  we  have  said,  this  gap  is  now 
quite low by historic standards.  so capacity is becoming relatively scarce 
compared to-the existing level of output. 
But we  need also to ask how  it compares with the level of capacity that 
would  be  needed  if  output  were  sufficiently  high  to  provide  full 
employment.  For this  purpose  we  need  to  make  an  illustrative  assumption 
about  the  level of full  employment.  We  shall assume  that it woulO  be  the 
average  level  for  1961  to  1980,  namely  3  per  cent.  ·sut  the  reader  can 
easily  see  the  result  of different  assumptions.  we  also  need  to  make  an 
assumption  ~ut the  rate  at  which  output  would  have  to  change  if 
unemployment  were·to be  red~ced.  Here,  for  illustration,  we  shall  assume 
that,  if unemployment  is  to  be  reduced  by  1  percentage  point,  industrial 
output  has  to  grow  by  an  extra  2  per  cent.  6  This  enables  us  to  compute 
full-employment  output  as  Y( l.  +  2( u  - o. 03 ) )  where  u  is the  unemployment 
rate.  The  corresponding  capacity required  has  been  assumed  to be  greater 
than  this  by  a  multiple  of  l./0. 85,  on  the  assumption  that  capacity 
utilisation  rates  of  over  85  per  cent  are  difficult  to  attain.  Thus 
full-employment  capacity is C*  where 
y 
C*  = --- 0.85  (1 + 2(U- 0.03)) 
The  calculation is purely illustrative,  to give .some  feel  for what has been 
going on. 
so What  does  Figure  3  suggest?  until 1978,  the available capacity (C) 
was  adequate,  or  more  than  adequate,  to  proouce  the  estimated  full 
employment  output.  However,  beginning with 1978,  it began to fall short of -13-
the  required  level~  an~ the gap  increased  stea~i1y.  By  1985,  capacity was 
on this asswnption 15 per cent below what is needed  for full employment. 7 
II.2  Implications 
Does  this  mean  that  there  is  no  hope  of  returning  nearer  to  full 
employment?  No,  for  at  least  five  reasons.  First,  as  Figures  2  and  3 
~how,  aggregate  capacity utilisation in industry is still 4  per cent below 
the  level of  85  per cent,  which  we  have  posited  as  a  critical level.  so 
some  expansion is possible with the existing capital,  used  in the eXisting 
way.s 
secon~,  the  capital  could  be  more  fully  utilised.  At  present  much 
capital is only  use~ for  one  shift.  For  example,  in Britain,  86  per cent 
of worker-hours  in manufacturing are worked between 8  am  and  6  pm. 
The  existing stock of capital will be  consistent with  a  larger output 
if capital is utilised  for  a  larger  number  of hours  per  day  or per  week. 
Measures  should  be  taken  in  the  field  of  labour  organisation  - at  the 
national  level  and  at the  level of individual  firms  - so  as  to permit  an~ 
encourage  this  more  intensive  utilisation  of  capital.  (On  this  problem, 
see  J.  Dre~e,  "WOrk  Sharing:  Why?  Bow?  How  Not  ..•  ",  1985 ) •  It would  be 
particularly  helpful  if  longer  periods  of  capital  utilisation  coul~  be 
organised at finns  operating in the  "capacity-producing"  sectors.  This  is 
not  only because these  sectors produce  "capacity"  for the others,  but also 
because they are currently characterised by the highest degrees of capacity 
utilisation,  as conventionally measured.9 
Third,  the  fall  in oil prices  relative  to  wages  and  output  will make 
profitable again  a  certain amount  of the  capital which  would  otherwise  be 
unprofitable  to  work.  This  will  again  expand  effective  industrial 
capacity.  Similarly if our policies  for  wage  flexibility,  wage  restraint 
and  removal of barriers to entry were  followed,  this would make it possible (3) 
- 14- -
for many  European  industries to take more  aovantage of any growth in worlO 
demano.  such  ~proved profitability woulO  again e~~  effective capacity. 
Fourth,  the calculations which  we  have  done  relate to  in~ustry,  Where 
the  capacity problem is the  most  severe.  In services,  which  produce  much 
more  than  half.  the  output  of  the  community,  the  physical  capacity 
constraint is much  less clear (even When  there is one-shift working).  For 
example,  the  capacity  of  a  shop  is  highly  elastic,  as  we  experience  at 
Christmas,  an~ offices likewise can be used to a  greater or less intensity. 
But  finally,  and most  important,  capacity can be increased.  This makes 
it essential to  un~erstand what  affects capacity,  an~ to What  extent extra 
~emano for output might generate sufficient capacity to supply it. 
II.3  Determinants of capacity 
There  are  two  textbook  types  of explanation  of  changes  in  capacity: 
supply factors  and  deman~  fa~tors. 
( i)  According  to  the  supply  hypothesis,  the  prime  Cletermi.nant  of 
changes  in capacity is profitability,  which  depends  in turn on real  factor 
prices  and  on  other matters  such  as  the  regulations  affecting the  use  of 
factors  of proouction.  on  this  line of thought  the  recent  standstill  in 
capacity  has  been  caused  by  the  fact  that  labour  costs  have  jwn~ up 
during  the  1970s,  with  a  rise  in  real  labour  cost  (in  terms  of  product 
wages)  faster than growth of proouctivity.  Tbis occurred particularly from 
aroun~  1974  to  the  early  1980s.  AsiOe  from  higher  wages,  growing 
rigidities  in  the  structure  of  employment  relations,  tenure  arrangements 
and  so  on  has  resulted  in  an  increase  in  the  effective  hourly  cost  of .. 
labour. 
Whether set in terms of a  putty-clay moClel  or a  putty-putty competitive 
J'I'IOCiel,  higher  labour  costs,  in  the  short  run,  will  tend  to  reOuce  the 
output  worth  producing.  This  will  reOuce  our  measure  of  capacity  -.  -15-
~epen~ing in practice on how  this is calculat~ by employers.  In the  long 
run,  it woul~ ten~ to reduce the capacity worth maintaining as well as the 
output  worth  prooucing.  This  woul~  certainly  be  the  case  if the  real 
interest rate Ooes  not Oecline. 
Following  on  this,  one  might  expect  to  see  a  ~ecline  in  oomestic 
interest  rates  un~er  the  impact  of  the  r~uce~  investment,  though  the 
extent  woul~  ~epend  on  what  happens  to  interest  rates  elseWhere  anCI  on 
capital mobility.  If this fall occurs,  there  might  be  some  ten~ency for 
the  capital/output  ratio  to  rise,  thus  partially  offsetting  the  fall  in 
investment.  However,  even  with  given  saving  an~  investment,  one  shoulCI 
fin~  investment  taking  more  capital-intensive  forms,  so ·that  the  capacity 
would become  growingly  ina~equate to employ all the labour. 
( ii}  Accor~ing  to  the  demand  explanation,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
capacity level is set with  reference to expected output.  (EVen  though,  in 
this model  the  real wage  does  not directly affect  the  level of output,  it 
could  affect  it  indirectly  via  an  influence  on  the  feasil:>le  level  of 
aggregate  ~emanCI.  This holds,  in particular,  in  an  open  economy  when  the 
real  wage  an~  aggregate  demanCI  determine . the  curent  account  balance. 
Therefore,  given  external ba1ance  requirements,  the  real wage  may  control 
the level of target aggregate  Cleman~ chosen by the authorities). 
The  two  explanations  are  not mutually  exclusive.  In particular,  real 
unit  costs  an~ other  supply  factors  influence  market  shares  (of Europe  in 
the world  economy)  and  demand  factors  influence market  size.  In the short 
run,  the  output  of  a  firm  is  determined  by  effective  demanC!  (given  its 
costs  an~ worl~ prices),  subject to the limit of physical capacity.  In the 
longer  run,  net  investment  ten~s to bring physical capacity into line with 
effective  deman~,  both  at  the  level  of  the  firm  anC!  in  aggregate. 
Equilibrium degrees of capacity utilisation reflect both the relative costs - 16-
of  capital  and  labour,  and  the  {relative)  short-run  variability of  both 
demand,  productivity and  factor availability. 
As  Figures  3  and  4  show,  in 1974 capacities were  fully used  and  output 
was  constrained by the  availability of  factors  {both  labour  and  capital). 
The  decline  in capacity utilisation in  1975  reflected mainly  the  downturn 
in  aggregate  demand.  From  1975  to  1978,  capacity  rose  in  line  with  the 
increase in output.  In  1980  capacity utilisation fell sharply and  in line 
with this,  capacity ceased to grow. 
From  now  on,  it  may  be  expected  that  efective  demand  growth  would 
trigger  investment  for  capacity  expansion.  But  the  situation  differs 
widely  both  across  sectors  (w~th  spare  capacities  least  visible  in  the 
capital goods  industries) and across countries (with spare capacities least 
visible in Denmark,  Germany  and the Netherlands) .10 
The  question  then  arises  as  to  how  rapid  an  expansion  could  be  hoped 
for,  what  policy  mix  would  be  appropriate  to  encourage  it,  and  how  the 
additional investment would be  financed. .  -- ..  __ .... 
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PIGURE  4 
Industrial.ouptut  (Y)  and  productive capacity (C) 
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III.  MACROECONOMIC  POLICY 
III.1  The  feas1ble scale of expansion 
If European  output  continues  to  grow  at  say  21z  per  cent  a  year, 
unemployment will not  fall.  suppose that  instea~ we  aim to reduce it with 
reasonable  speed  to  the  level  of  the  late  1970s.  This  means  that 
unemployment  will  fall  by  6  points  ( from  11  to  5  per  cent).  How  much 
output would  grow  in  or~er to achieve this depends  on  the  complex issue of 
the  relation between  the  growth  of output  and  the  change  in  unemployment. 
The  COnunission 's projection  of  the  cooperative  growth  scenario  implies  a 
coefficient of 1.2.  A reasonable estimate is somewhere  between this figure 
and  the  Figure of  2  that  we  used  earlier.  on  any of these  assumptions  we 
suggest that if unemployment  is reduced  by  6  points with  reasonable  spe~, 
conditions must  be created for growth to build up to a  level of 5  per cent 
a  year for a  limited perioa.11 
such  rates  of  growth  have  been  by  no  means  uncorranon  in  the  past, 
especially  at  times  of  high  unemployment.  In  fact  in  some  countries 
uemployment  has  fallen  quite  rapi<1ly  after  reaching  a  high  ~ale.  For 
example  in the five years 1932-37  unemployment  in Britain fell by  81z points 
( from  17  to  81z  per cent)  and  unemployment  in  the  u.s.  fell  by  14  points 
( from  23  to  9  per  cent).  Of  course  both  economic  and  institutional 
conditions during the 1930s were very different to those which exist today. 
It is also true that the 1970s were years of experience which cannot simply 
be  rolled back  in their entirety.  Perceptions  an~ reactions have  change<1. 
Nevertheless,  the recovery of 1932-37 is not without interest. 
III.2  Inflation and the need  for wage  restraint 
But will not  a  faster rate of growth inevitably bring an increase in 
the  inflation  rate?  This  is,  after  all,  probably  the  greatest  fear  at -20-
present.  There is no  ~oUbt that inflationary pressure  woul~ be higher than 
othexwise.  Thus,  as  we  have  argu~ in  earlier  reports  1  wage  restraint 
shoul~ be  a  crucial element  in the policy,  with wages  rising little faster 
than prices. 
But  the  exact  scale  an~ nature  of the  inflationary  problem  remains  a 
matter  of  consi~erable  Clebate.  Unfortunately  I  even  though  the  relation 
between  wage  an~  price  inflation  anc1  aggregate  activity  - the  s~alled 
Phillips  curve  - has  been  a  subject  of  intensive  inquiry  in  the  last 
Oecaoel  there is disagreement  on many  issues,  and  in particular on the role 
play~ by the rate of change of unemployment  (or employment). 
some,  like  Blanchard  and  summersl2  have  argued  that  wage  behaviour  in 
fact depends mainly on the change in employment.  This,  if true,  would mean 
that,  in the  absence  of  induced  wage  restraint,  any  permanent  decrease  of 
unemployment  would  lead  to  a  prolonged  period  of  higher  inflation.  The 
mechanism  that  is  said  to  explain  this  is the  fact  that  existing workers 
(insi~ers) only  care  about  keeping  their  own  jobs,  ano  thus  the  eXisting 
level  of  employment  is  always  the  critical  level  above  which  inflation 
increases (and vice versa). 
Others,  such  as  La  yard  and  Nickell,  13  argue  that  there  ts  in  fact  a 
long-run  NAIRU  (non-accelerating-inflation  rate of unemployment) .  But  if 
unemployment  is  driven  above  it,  as  in  the  last  few  years,  there  is  a 
short-run NAIRU  Which  is a  good  deal higher than the  long-run  NAIRO.  This 
is  because  rises  of  unemployment  lea~  to  disproportionate  increases  in 
long-tenn  unemployment,  and  the  long-term  unemployed  are  an  ineffective 
source of labour supply.  Given that  unemp~oyment is ·now  above the long-run 
NAIRU 1  it  can  be  re~uced  without  increasing  inflation  provided  it  is 
re~uceo slowly.  But  faster reduction of unemployment  can  only be  achieved 
without  extra  inflation if jobs  are explicitly  targette~ at  the  long-term - 21-
unemployed  or if tbere  is effective  wage  restraint.  In  support  of their 
view  La.yaro  and  Nickell  point  to  the  rise  of  unemployment  at  given 
vacancies  Which  has  happeneCl  in many  countries.  This  cannot  be  explainec3 
by  the  Blanchartl/Summers  analysis  but  can  be  partly  explained  by  the 
long-tenn  unemployment  and  other  supply-side  factors.  In  adClition  the 
Blanchard/Summers analysis cannot explain Why  in the  long  term the rise of 
the labour force affects the level of employment. 
others  still,  such  as  sneessens  ano  Drete,l4  argue  that  the 
inflation/unemployment  relationship  cannot  be  isolated  from  the  degree  of 
capacity utilisation.  There  are  two  sources of inflation - cost push  anc3 
Clemand  pull.  And  there  are  two  determinants  of  employment  - effective 
Clemand  and  production capacities  (places of work).  Rates of unemployment, 
and  of  excess  capacity,  compatible  with  given  levels  of  inflation  are 
determined  simultaneously,  against  the  background  of  income  claims  (wages 
and  profits)  and  of  classical  unemployment  (unemployment  at  full  use  of 
available capacities). 
The  three  stories  have  important  elements  in  cononon.  In  all  three, 
there  are  elements  of  ''hysteresis"  meaning  that  the.  current 
non-inflationary level of unemployment is affecteO by past history.  In the 
Sneessens-orete  version,  the hysteresis  is embodied  in the  capital  stoCk. 
In  the  BlancharClfS\.DTD'I\ers  version  there  is  total  hysteresis,  and  in  the 
Layard/Nickell version there is partial hysteresis.  Thus  it seems  wise to 
proceed  on  the  assumption  that What  can be  attempted  in Europe  is limited 
by our recent past. 
There have of course been episodes in other times and places Where  this 
has  not  appeared  to  be  the  case.  The  u.s.  reflations  of  1961-64  and 
1982-86  proceeOed  without  countemporaneous  increases  in  inflation  (the 
second helped by  a  massive terms of trade gain and  growing  unemployment  in (4) 
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the rest of the world).  And  even the huge  u.s.  recovery  from  1938 to 1941 
saw  inflation rising  from  - 1.4 per cent  in  1938  to  only 1.4 per cent  in 
1940,  and then 7.5 per cent in 1941.  But we  could not safely now  in Europe 
rely upon the same degree of luck. 
We  would  therefore  suggest  that,  to  ward  off the  inflation  risk,  the 
recovery  plan  needs  to  have  the  approval  and  explicit  support  of  all 
economic  actors  - business  and  labour.  This  should  include  a  pledge  of 
containing  wage  increases within the  limits of price  increases  as  long  as 
unemployment  remains  above  some  stated  leve  1  - which  means  essentially 
during  the  duration  of the  recovery  program.  This  could  be  matched  by  a 
pledge  on the part of business  not  to try to expand  profit margins,  which 
should  not  be  a  serious  sacrifice  considering  that  profits  shoul~  be 
greatly  swelled  by  the  large  rise  in  volume.  Those  pledges  might,  of 
course,  be  reinforced  by  a  .formal  and  binding  type  of  incomes  policy,  in 
countries where this was  feasible or appropriate.  In  a  country  like Italy 
which still makes wide-spread use of escalator clauses,  one might  suggest a 
set-up  ensuring  roughly  100  per  cent  inflation-coverage  as  the  combined 
result  of  escalator  clauses  and  new  nominal  contracts.  In  the  United 
Kingdom  a  taxed-based  incomes  policy might  be the natural  route.  The most 
obvious  success  of  incomes  policy  in  recent  years  has  been  in  France  (a 
policy applying strictly in the public sector and  followed  by agreement  in 
the private sector).  This has helped to reduce inflation from 12
1z  per cent 
in 1982 to 4  per cent today without any  large increase in unemployment. 
so  wage  restraint  is  necessary,  and  so  are  the  other  supply-side 
measures  discussed  in  our  last  report.15  But,  in  terms  of  the  inflation 
risk,  it  is  hard  to  imagine  a  better  moment  to  embark  on  a  policy  of 
expansion,  with both oil prices and  the dollar on our side. -23-
III.3  Generating and  financing the expansion of capacity 
we  can  therefore  revert  to  our  initial  focus,  an~  ask  how  an 
adequate  expansion of capacity can be  achieved  and how  it can be  financed. 
In  the  last  15  years,  the  largest  increase  in  capacity  for  the  community 
has  been  6  per  cent  per  annum  (about  the  same  as  for  output)  1  and  the 
maximum  for  a  single  country  has  been  about  10  per  cent  (Italy  1976). 
Increases of this size have  not  raised. any  problem,  but  significantly the 
expansion  required  now  needs  to be sustained over a  longer period than has 
been the case in the examples given. 
If output were to grow  2~ percentage points a  year more  than otherwise 
( at  5  per cent  rather than  21z)  and  we  assume  an  incremental capital/output 
ratio of 2,  the share of investment in total output would have to rise by 5 
percentage points of GOP  ( 2  x  21z).  This is probably an exaggeration,  given 
the  existing  spare  capacity  and  the  role  which  services  will play  in  the 
expansion.  Even  so,  an  expansion  on  the  scale  we  envisage  poses  a 
substantial challenge  .  IJWo  issues need to be confronted. 
First,  there is the challenge to the equipment-producing industry.  The 
capacity utilisation in this area was high by 1985;  in that year equipment 
investment  rose  some  6  per  cent,  substantially  more  than  the  rise  in 
capacity  of  the  equipment  industry,  whose  capacity  utilisation  rose, 
therefore,  3  to  4  per cent in most  subsectors,  reaching rates of 82-86 per 
cent.  Furthennore  1  by year  end,  the  rates  haCI  risen to the  84  to  88  per 
cent level. 
It  is  not  clear  how  fast  capacity  and  output  can  grow  in  these 
industries,  though  it  is  encouraging  that  they  are  reported  to  plan  an 
increase in  investment by  15  per cent  in 1986  on top of a  15 per cent rise 
in 1985  (EUropean Economy,  January  1986,  supplement  B).  In any case,  some 
of the equipment  woul~ be  imported  from outside Europe. -24-
The  second  question is where  the finance will come  from to pay for the 
extra share  of  investments  in  national  income.  It will mainly  come  from 
two sources.  First,  the European current account surplus will come  ~own as 
Europe expands  and the effects of the lower  ~ollar come  through.  This year 
the  community's  current  account  surplus  is  forecast  at roughly  1  per cent 
of GNP.  As  this tums  round,  the  unhealthy deficits of the  u.s.  and  the 
thiltl worl(l (lebtor countries will come  ~own,  an(l  Europe will cease to be  an 
exporter  of  capital.  Second,  the  share  of  consumption  in  income  will 
(lecline.  This  naturally ten(ls to happen  in an  upturn,  since  a  sUbstantial 
fraction of any  rapi~ rise in output does  not get consume(!.  (In the  longer 
term  a  permanently higher  rate  of  growth  woul(l  also  increase  the  savings 
rate by  about  2  per cent  of  income  for  every  1  per  cent  of  growth,  in  a 
stea(ly state).l6  However to generate the higher savings,  we  have to ensure 
that  our  expansion  package  includes  the  right  mixture  of  monetary  and 
fiscal policies. 
III.4  MOnetary  an(l  fiscal policies 
The  stan(larcl  view,  though  not  universally  accepted,  is  that  the 
world  economy  has  been  suffering  from  inappropriate  miXtures  of  monetary 
an(l  fiscal policy on both  sie3es of the Atlantic.  The  u.s  .A.  has  pursued  a 
high  interest  rate  monetary  policy,  in  oroer  to  restrain  the  possible 
inflationary  effects  of  an  expansionary  bu~get.  The  net  effect  of  the 
expansionary budget  an(l  relatively tight money  has been  favourable to u.s. 
employment  an(l  has  helpe~ unemployment to fall by about  4  percentage points 
over  the  last  4  years.  But  it also  le(l  to  a  strong  appreciation  of the 
(Iollar,  Which  together  with  the  high  u.s.  activity  rate,  generated  the 
present huge u.s.  tra~e deficit. 
Though  this  <3eficit  provide(!  jobs  in  Europe,  Europe  was  forced  to 
acc~pt the high worl(l  real interest rates.  The alternative woul(l  have been -25-
a  further  depreciation  of  the  European  currencies,  sharpening  the  twin 
dangers of inflation in Europe  and protectionism in the u.s.  The high real 
interest  rates  were,  in  the  absence  of  wage  restraint,  bad  for  European 
employment.  on  top  of  this  the  European  governments  also  a<:lopted  much 
tighter fiscal policies.  In the community between 1979  and tooay the share 
of taxes  (and social security contributions) in the national income rose by 
between  3  and  4  percentage  points.  17  At  the  same  time  the  share  of 
goverrunent  expenditure  (net  of  transfers )  barely  changed, 18  ana  as  a 
proportion  of  potential  output  (however  measured)  such  government 
expenditure  fell  substantially. 
contractionary.19 
Thus  the  net  impact  of  the  budget  was 
The  situation has  now  changed substantially.  First,  the oil price fall 
has  reduced  the  level  of  world  inflation,  just  as  the  earlier oil price 
rises  lifted it.  second,  the  u.s.  has  relaxed  its monetary  policy  enough 
to  permit  a  fall  in  the  dollar.  Thus  the  Clanger  of  an  unacceptably  low 
value  for the European  currencies  (with the  associateCl  inflation risk) has 
been  remove<:~.  This  makes  it  much  easier  for  Europeans  countries  to 
consider a  coordinated monetary expansion. 
woulCl  this be the right thing to do?  It is quite possible that in the 
process of increasing  employment,  there will be  such  a  scarcity of capital 
that  high  real  interest  rates  will  correspond  to  the  correct  pattern  of 
factor prices.  In the  light of this,  long-term real rates may  remain high 
for  some  time.  But  this  does  not  argue  against  greater monetary  ease  in 
the  short  run.  In  the  new  context,  lower  short-term real  interest  rates 
and  (where appropriate )  less credit rationing would be  important parts of a 
package  for  European  recovery.  Lower  interest rates  in turn will  involve 
somewhat higher monetary aggregates,  justified by a  fall in the velocity of 
circulation of money. (5) 
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III.S  The  structure of fiscal policy 
There  is also  a  nee~ for  fiscal  expansion  in  Europe.  How  should 
this be  structur~?  Given our previous  ~iscussion, we  must ensure that the 
requisite savings  emerge  to  finance  the construction of new  capacity.  we 
cannot have  a  consumption-led boom.  In  a~~ition fiscal expansion must  not 
le~ to a  permanently growing ratio of ~ebt to income.  It shoul~ therefore 
be  focusse~ mainly  on  temporary  incentives  to  employing  more  labour  an~ 
creating more  capital. 
Labour  is the sur.plus  factor,  but owing to complementarity between the 
factors,  one  mu8~ pursue both objectives simultaneously.20  It is only when 
output is fixed that more  capital implies  less employment.  But  we  clearly 
want  the  expansion  of  capital  to  take  as  labour-intensive  a  form  as 
possible.  In  other  words  we  want  capital  widening  rather  than  capi  ta1 
deepening.  This means  that,  where possible,  it is the real cost of labour 
that we  want to reduce rather than the real cost of capital. 
So  let  us  first  consider  steps  to  encourage  e~ansion of the  capital 
stock.  This  consists  of  the  public  and  private  capital  stock,  both  of 
which may  ne~ to grow  when  national output rises. .  In some  countries the 
publ.ic  capital  stock  has  become  quite  run  down,  and  the  case  for 
infrastructure  investment  is quite  strong.  This  must  be  judged  on  normal 
social. rate of return criteria.  Where it passes this test,  an expansion of 
the  government  deficit to  finance  such  investment  can  involve  no  crowding 
out  of  investment  in total,  since  by definition it can  at worst  divert  a 
given  volume  of  savings  from  financing  private  investment  to  financing 
equally-profitable public investment. 
However  the main expansion is needed  in private investment.  Incentives 
to  investment  in  the  form  of tax provisions  and  subsidies have  apparently' 
prov~ to  be  not  very  effective  in  stimulating  investment. 21  But,~ in -27-
a~dition,  they  have  the  serious  drawback  of  encouraging  substitution  of 
labour  with  capital,  at  a  time  when  labour  is  abundant  and  capital 
presumably  scarce.  so we  see little use  in trying more  of that medicine, 
except  for  an  investment  tax creOit of relatively short duration  (cf.  two 
handed  approach).  In  this  case  the  ~ominant effect of such  a  measure  is 
the desirable one of shifting investment  forward  in time. 
MOre  generally - as to the existing widespread public-sector transfers 
to  the  corporate  sector,  we  believe  that  a  critical  review  shoul~  be 
carried  out,  for  each  member  country  anf!l  in  a  comparative  way,  of  the 
complex network of grants,  subsidies,  tax reliefs,  credits,  participations, 
etc. 
While  some  of these interventions may  be warranted,  it does  seem  urgent 
to  us  that  the  arguments  for  their  continuation  on  the  present  scale, 
diffusion  an~  lack  of  transparency,  should  be  reconsidere~ more  closel.y. 
The  EC  Comm.i.sion  has  recently  undertaken  a  systematic  review  of  these 
interventions  for  France,  Germany  and  the  U.K.,  with  comparisons  with  the 
u.s.,  anf!l  has  identified  a  number  of  critical  issues  concerning  the 
budgetary cost of financial supports to industry,  their effects  i~ terms of 
efficiency,  their consequences  on  the  EC  internal market,  their degree  of 
transparency.22 
In  some  countries,  attempts  have  been  made  to  estimate  the 
macroeconomic  consequences  of  a  massive  reduction  in  these  government 
interventions,  including  the  aggregate  and  sectoral  effects  on  employment 
that woul~ derive  from  a  reduction in personal taxes matching the reduction 
of expenditure  on  subsidies.23  Simulations  seem  to  indicate positive  net 
effects on employment  and the subject is worth pursuing. 
What  has  to  be  stressed,  in  the  context  of  our  proposed  strategy,  is 
that  financial  support by governments  seems  to go to a  large extent to the -28-
protection  of  unproductive  capacity  at  ol~  firms  in  sectors  facing 
~eclining  ~eman~,  to  the  detriment  of  the  creation  of  new  firms  and  of 
capital formation in sectors facing high  ~emano.  This runs contrary to the· 
requirements  of  a  policy  ailneO  at  removing  the  capital  constraint  on 
employment  growth. 
If a  factor is to be  subsidiseo  (or  ~etaxeo), it shoultJ  mainly  be  the 
abuntJant  factor,  labour.  several methods  have been  suggesteo to  ~lement 
this  approach.  The  methoc1  we  aClvocate  is  that  of  "marginal  employment 
subsidies",  preferably in the  fo:r:m  of rebating to the employer some  portion 
of  payroll  taxes  on  net  aCidi tions  to  payrolls  ( in  terms  of  number  of 
workers,  not in tenns of hours  worketJ  or of wage bill).  This  scheme  has a 
number of desirable features. 
(a)  Provided the rebate is guaranteed to last some  time,  it will encourage 
labour-intensive techniques. 
(b)  It will lower Oomestic costs of production relative to the rest of the 
world,  increasing  exports  - and  aggregate  Clemano  - ana  the  increase  in 
exports will be valuable to attenuate the effect on the balance of trade of 
a  rapi(l  expansion  of Oemand.  It is true that if this measure  is aClopted 
simultaneously  - as  it  should  be  to  avoiO  intracommuni  ty  raiding  - its 
effect on the  demand  from this source would  come  only  from that portion of 
trade that is Oirected to the rest of the world.  However,  it is also true 
that the gains obtainetJ abroao by each country will spill over to the other 
member countries through  intra-community traCle. 
(c)  But  one  coultJ  expect  some  effects  even  in  a  closeo  economy,  by 
lowering  marginal costs,  thus  shifting the· ·supply  cu:rve.  In  addition,  of 
course,  the  newly-employed  create  their  own  Oemanc3,  as  long  as  the 
incre~ntal savings  are  absorbed  into  investment,  which,  as  we  have  said -29-
repeatedly,  is pretty safe to assume  once output gets growing  an~ monetary 
policy is accolllmO(lating. 
Finally we  shoul~ comment  on pUblic consumption.  This again  shoul~ be 
ju~g~.on its merits.  But there  ~oes not  seem to be  a  major  role for big 
expansion  of  public  employment  in  Europe  except  in  the  fonn  of  special 
programmes  for  the  long-tenn  unemployed,  such  as  are  aovocated  in  the 
TWo-BanO~ Approach.  Many  of these  schemes  coulO  in  any  case be  ope  rat~ 
through the private sector. 
A  feasible  policy  for  creating  oemano  has  to be  such  that at one  an~ 
the same time it generates the capacity to supply the  ~emano.  Thus it must 
generate  an  increase  in Oesired  investment,  as well  as  sufficient savings 
to  finance  this.  But  there  is  also  the  important  question  of  the 
microeoonomic  efficiency of the  process  by  Which  savings  are  allocated to 
investment,  to Which  we  now  turn. -30-
IV.  IMPROVING  THE  FINANCIAL  SYSTEM  IN  EUROPE 
rv.1  capital formation  and the efficiency of the financial system 
Along  with  the  macroeconomic  policies  suggested  above,  supply-side 
policies should be  pursued  in a  complementary  manner  in all three crucial 
markets:  the labour market,  the output market and the financial market. 
Actions  to  achieve  continued  wage  moderation,  to  contain  non-wage 
labour  costs  and  to  substantially  increase  the  flexillility  of the  labour 
market,  should  still be  considered  as  the  central  piece  of  supply-side 
policies in Europe.  If we  do  not dwell  on  them here,  beyond  what has been 
said in Section III.2 above,  it is simply because we  discussed this subject 
at  length  in  our  previous  report24  and  because  appropriate  measures  have 
been spelt out in detail by the EC  Commission.25 
Policies  aimed  at  incre~ing the  supply  response  in  the  output  market 
are  also  important  and  should  be  carried  out  both  at  the  level  of 
individual  countries  and  at  the  EC  level.  A  large  set  of  measures 
contemplated  by  the  plan  for  the  completion  of  the  internal  market  for 
goods  and services belong precisely to this category.  Their implementation 
will  serve  the  purpose  not  only  of  a  Cleeper  integration  among  member 
countries,  but  also of increasing the  supply elasticity in each  country's 
market  for  goods  and  services.  In addition,  the  establishment of a  truly 
unified  market  will  itself  provide  a  powerful  impetus  for  capital 
formation.26 
structural policies to  improve  the  financial  system  in  Europe  are  not 
less essential.  we  wish to deal with them at some  length  for two  reasons. 
First,  capital  formation  in Europe  in the  next  few  years  is not  likely 
to  find  a  substantial  and  permanent  stimulus  in  an  overly  expansionary 
demand  management,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above.  It will have to rely - 31-
more,  therefore,  -on  improvements  in  the  financial  system  that  may 
facilitate the allocation of financial resources to promising initiatives. 
Secon~,  the  link between  the  employment  goal  an~ structural  financial 
policies  nee~s  to  be  stresse~.  Measures  to  increase  the  efficiency  of 
financial markets  an~  interme~iaries - in  in~ivi~ual countries  an~ in the 
EC  - are  usually  percei  vet3  by  public  opinion  as  bearing  little  or  no 
relationship with the  employment  issue.  However,  as  one key constraint to 
employment  growth  is  now  the  capital  constraint,  an~  since  it  cannot  be 
removet3  through  macroeconomic  policies  alone,  it  shoul~ become  clear that 
any  step  towards  a  more  efficient  financial  system,  which  will  allow  a 
larger capital  formation  for  any  given  set of macroeconomic  con~itons,  is 
to be viewed as  a  positive· contribution to employment policy. 
once  this  link  is  aCknowleOge~,  a  strategy  to  improve  financial 
allocation  in  Europe  is  likely to benefit  from  a  wiOer  political  support 
than has been the  case  so  far.  For this strategy to be  effective,  it has 
to  consist  of  two  coherent  sets  of  policies,  aiming  respectively  at 
improving  ~omestic financial systems,  an~ at achieving a  ~eeper integration 
among  them. 
rv.2  Improving  ~omestic financial systems 
Through the improvement of their ~omestic financial systems,  European 
countries may  increase the  formation of pr~uctive capital associated with 
any given volume of aggregate private savings  an~ current account position. 
Three  main  aspects  of public policies  come  into play here,  concerning 
respectively public sector investment,  public sector financial transfers to 
firms,  an~ public policies affecting the structure of the financial system. 
Issues  related to  the  first  two  aspects have  been  discusseO  above,  in the 
context of fiscal policy.  We  now  consiOer policies affecting the structure -32-
_of the  financial  system,  i.e.  the  array of monetary,  financial  an~ equity 
markets  an~ the various types of institutions which operate in them. 
A1though  measurements  in this  field  are particularly  ~ifficult,  it is 
commonly  agree~  that  several  European  countries  have  financial  systems 
which  cannot  be  regarded  as  optimal  from  the  point  of view  of  supporting 
the  formation of prc>Ouctive capital.  In particular, there seems to be room 
for  improvement in two  respects:  greater operational efficiency,  leading to 
the  provision  of  financial  services  to  the  economy  at  lower  costs;  and 
greater  allocative  efficiency,  assuring  that  savings  flow  to  those  uses 
with  the highest  expected  real  rates of return- - private or social  - for 
any given risk level. 
The  specification  of  these  objectives,  an~  the  measures  to  achieve 
them,  will of course  ~iffer from  country to country.  A strong case  can  be 
ma~e,  however,  that  in general  European  financial  systems  can  become  more 
efficient in both  respects  outline~ above  if domestic  pUblic policies  (by 
the  regulatory  bodies  an~  the  monetary  authorities):  ( i)  create  more 
competitive  con~i  tions  in  an~  among  the  markets  making  up  the  financial 
system;  an~ ( ii) reduce  the  "hidden  taxes"  that are presently levied  from 
the financial system. 
These  are  essentially  the  two  components  of  the  process  that  is 
sometimes  calle~ "domestic liberalisation" of financial markets.  It  shoul~ 
be  stressed,  however,  that  "deregulation"  as  such  is  neither  a  necessary 
nor a  sufficient condition for this two-siOed policy to be  tmplemented.  In 
several  cases,  regulatory  instruments  will  have  to  be  oriented  towar~s 
positively achieving more  competition,  rather than simply  ~ismantled. 
( i)  Greater  competition  tends  to  increase  the  operational  efficiency 
by  in~ucing financial institutions to contain their pr~uction costs and to 
operate  with  lower  profits.  Both  circumstances  result  in  lower -33-
intermediation  costs  for  the  economy  (see  Appen~ix).  Furthermore,  keener 
competition  leads  also  to  greater  allocative  efficiency  by  enabling 
financial  resources  to  respon~  more  easily  to  the  attraction  of  the 
different rates of return obtainable  from the various uses. 
As  to ways  to increase competition,  most  of them  should be  in~entifi~ 
in  changes  in  those  controls by  means  of Which  the  authorities  themselves 
to  a  large  extent  ~eter.mine the  ~egree of competition  (barriers to entry, 
specification  of  the  types  of  financial  operations  that  each  category  of 
institutions  is  allowe~  to  carry  out,  policies  towar~s  cartels,  etc. ) . 
These  changes  shoul~  go  in  the  ~irection of  a  certain  relaxation  of  the 
••protection"  granted to existing  financial  institutions,  while at the  same 
time  relieving  them  from  the  various  "portfolio  constraints"  impos~ upon 
them in several countries (see below). 
(ii)  Hi~~en taxation results  from  ~ifferent  forms  of coercion  exerted 
by the authorities on the allocation of financial  resources,  most typically 
through  portfolio  constraints  plac~  upon  banks  an~  other  financial 
institutions  (compulsory  investments  in  certain  types  of  securities, 
cei1ings on  specifi~ kin~s of loans,  high  reserve  requirements  ~aring no 
interest  or  a  strongly  penalising  one,  etc. )  but  frequently  also  upon 
non-financial  firms  (e.g.  compulsory  financing  in  foreign  exchange  for 
certain  operations)  and  on  househol~s (e.g.,  restrictions  on  the  purchase 
of  foreign  assets  ) .  "Taxation"  is  involved,  both  because  coercion  is 
applied - which is typical of fiscal instruments rather than of tra~itional 
monetary  policy  instruments  - an~ because  it produces  effects  similar  to 
those of explicit taxation, .  though  in a  "hi~~en" way. 
It can be  shown  that such systems of controls  ~o impose  hi~~en taxes on 
the  economy  (through  lower  returns  to  savers  an~ higher costs  for  certain 
borrowers,  usually  in the  private  sector),  the  "revenue"  of which  accrues -34-
mostly  to  the  public  sector  (through  a  larger  supply  of  fun~s at  lower 
rates to that sector).27 
A  r~uction of such  taxation  can  be  achieve~ by  means  of appropriate 
structural changes in financial regulation  an~ of changes  in the  meth~s of 
monetary control,  so  as to make  it less  ~epen~ent on  portfolio constraints 
an~ more  on  market  mechanisms.  This  re~uction in  hi~~en taxation has  not 
only  the  a~vantage  of  bringing  about  a  greater  transparency  (notably 
concerning the cost of the public sector),  but also that of increasing both 
the operational efficiency of the financial system ( smaller margins between 
len~ing an~ borrowing rates) and  its allocative efficiency (especially when 
the  effect  of  the  portfolio  constraints  is  to  encourage  the  flow  of 
financial resources to uses with  low or nil pr~uctivity, e.g.  financing of 
public sector current account deficit, or ~issaving). 
Along  with  a  re~uction in explicit taxes  (an~  subsi~ies) on  financial 
markets  - to the extent allowed by budgetary considerations - a  ~ecrease in 
hi~~en taxation of the financial system would  really amount  to reducing the 
buroen  on  the  savings-investment  process  an~ at  the  same  time  increasing 
the efficiency with which  financial markets perform the allocative function 
in  that  process:  two  results  which  are  of  crucial  importance  in  the 
framework  of  a  strategy  for  productive  capital  formation  to  sustain 
employment  growth. 
It will be  noted  that there  is close  complementarity between  reducing 
hi~~en  taxation  and  increasing  competition  in  the  financial  system. 
Greater competition is necessary to ensure that the easing of inappropriate 
bur~ens on  financial  institutions,  which  woul~ flow ·from  a  lower  ~egree of 
hi~~en taxation,  is passed on  to users of financial services,  i.e.  is fully 
reflecte~  in  lower  interme~iation  costs  for  the  economy,  rather  than  in 
higher profits for financial institutions themselves. -35-
A  revision  of  financial  policies  along  the  lines  suggesteCI  here  C!oes 
aim  at  stimulating  efficient  capital  formation  also  through  a  greater 
allocative neturality on the part of the authorities than has been observed 
in  the  past.  This  C!oes  not  necessarily  mean  that · governments  shoulC! 
refrain  altogether  from  influencing  financial  allocation.  Within  our 
strategy,  however,  they  shoulC!  C!o  so  more  by  making  use  of  efficient 
financial  markets  than  by  impeding  their  efficiency  through  direct 
controls.  Furthermore,  to  the  extent  that  allocative  purposes  remain  in 
governments'  objectives,  they  shoulC!  be  orienteC!  mainly  in  favour  of  new 
firms,  of  growing  small  anc:l  mec:lium-sizec:l  firms,  especially  those 
characterisec1 by relatively low capital intensity.  Much  remains to be Clone 
in order for those firms to gain easier access to capital markets.28 
In  the  last few  years,  several European  countries have  started to move 
in  the  directions  suggested  above.  Increased  competition  among  financial 
institutions has been  encourage(!.  Less  use has been made  of hideten  taxes, 
especially in the  form of C!irect controls over credit flows.  The  level and 
structure  of  interest  rates  have  moved  more  freely.  The  more  liberal 
environment  has  permi.tteCl  the  emergence  of ·many  new  types  of  instrwnents 
and  intermediaries,  reflecting the needs of borrowers  and  lenders. 
Although  there  are  problems  associated  with  these  developments  - in 
particular,  supervisory  problems  in  relation  to  financial  stability  - we 
consider it is important that this trend  should be  continued  and  should  be 
intensified,  to  the  advantage  of  capital  formation  in  Europe.  Certain 
countries,  that  in  the  last  few  months  have  temporarily  reverted  to 
previous practices basec:l,  in particular,  on credit ceilings,  should  resume 
the  new  trend of domestic  financial liberalisation as  soon as possible. -36-
rv.3  Government  ~ebt an~ capital-market liberalisation: 
the role of in~ex~ bon~s 
Perhaps the main  reason that keeps the authorities of some  countries 
from  further  pursuing  financial  liberalisation  (both  domestic  am~  in  the 
fielO  of capital movements),  is that  in  a  regime  without  hic3dent  taxation 
of  the  financial  system  the  Treasury  woulO  have  to  pay  more  competitive 
interest rates on its issues.  BesiOes the  aoverse buOgetary  consequences, 
this  may  contribute to keep  up  interest rates  also  for other borrowers  in 
the bOn«!!  market (although,  for example,  bank lending rates would  be  lowered 
by the elimination of hi~den taxation,  Where this took the form of ceilings 
on bank loans). 
We  believe  that  this  problem  coulO  be  solveo  at  least  in  part  by 
introducing  index-linkec3  bonOs  among  the  financing  instruments  of  the 
Treasury,  an  innovation  that  we  woulc3  recommend  also  in  those  countries 
that  have  alreaoy  proceeded  to  a  sUbstantial  liberalisation  of  their 
financial  system,  if  they  wish  to  give  some  stimulus  to  the 
saving-investment process for any given demand  policy stance.29 
In  several  financial  markets,  many  agents  still maintain  fairly  high 
expectations  concerning  the  unoerlying  rate of inflation,  in spite  of the 
recent  remarkable Oeclines in observeo inflation rates.  These expectations 
may  take  the  form  of  a  high  expected  rate  of  inflation  (relative,  for 
example,  to  government  plans  or  to  consensus  forecasts )  ano;or  a  large 
variance associated with the inflationary expectation.  In such conditions, 
a  borrower  issuing  a  long  term  bonO  with  principal  linked  to  the  general 
price level is likely to be  able to raise  funds  at a  lower real cost than 
would be  implieO by issuing conventional bonds of the  same  maturity,  as it 
does  not have  to compensate  the  lender with an  inflation-risk premium.  At 
the  same  time,  the  borrower  itself acquires  the  certainty  concerning  the -37-
real cost of  financing  over the  Whole  life of the  bon~,  rather than being 
expos~  to  unexpecte~  changes  in  the  real  cost  as  is  the  case  with 
conventiona1  bOn~s  an~ with  floating-rate  nominal  bon~s as well.  This  may 
be  of  particular  ~portance  in  connection  with  the  financing  of 
capital-wi~ening investment - Which  shoul~ be  increase~,  un~er the strategy 
a~vocat~  in  this  report  - because  that  kin~  of  investment  implies  an 
extention  of  the  forecasting  horizon  an~  therefore  more  uncertain 
inflationary expectations. 
It  is  true  that  a  company  issuing  bOn~s  linke~ to  the  general  price 
level  woul~ be  expose~ to  a  relative-price risk,  as  prices of its outputs 
may  move  differently  from  the  general  price  level.  30  But  it should  be 
noted that this does  not apply to the Treasury.  Since its receipts - taxes 
- are  indeed  linked  to  the  general  price  level  ( inaexation  of  the  tax 
system,  even  if aplied,  woul~  simply  make  this  relationship  proportional 
rather  than  progressive),  the  Treasury  is  poss~ly the  only  agent  in the 
economy,  which,  without  incurring  relative-price  risks,  can  "sell" 
inflation  coverage  on  financial  instruments,  obtaining  as  revenue  a 
decrease  in  its  own  real  cost  of  financing.  It  is  paradoxical  for  a 
government  not  to  exploit  this  sort of  "natural  monopoly"  it potentially 
enjoys,  and  at the  same  time to artificially impose distorting elements of 
monopoly  through  various  types  of  constraints  in  order  to  make  Treasury 
financing easier. 
There  are possible objections to the  in~exation proposal,  but  they may 
be  overcome.  Issuing  indexed  bOnds,  it is sometimes  feared,  may  appear  a 
surren~er to  inflation;  but  clearly  this  preoccupation  might  have  been 
more  serious a  few years ago than it is under the present conditions of low 
inflation.  It  is  contradictory  - states  another  argtunent  - to  index 
financial  instruments  while  trying  to  re~uce  in~exation  in  the  labour -38-
market;  but  it  should  be  noted  that  wage  indexation  has  by  now  been 
sUbstantially reduced  in several countries,  and that at any  rate  no  stmple 
symmetry  can  be  established  between  wage  indexation  and  asset  indexation, 
for  a  number  of  reasons  made  clear  by  the  literature.  31  Setting  the 
"appropriate"  real. rate on indexed bonds is difficult and may  make  an issue 
either  unattractive  or else  too  attractive at  the  expense  of  non-indexed 
issues  of the  Treasury itself or other borrowers;  but  this  difficulty is 
reduced if indexed  bonds  - which  should  be  fully  negotiable  instruments  -
are  issued  by  tender.  Finally,  some  monetary  authorities  are  concerned 
that  indexed  bonds,  as  they  reduce  nominal  interest  payments  relative  to 
conventional  or  floating-rate  bonds  and  shift  the  servicing  burclen  over 
time,  may  give  the  fiscal  authorities  the  impression  that  more  room  is 
available  for  other expenditures;  but  this  can  be  avoided  by establishing 
that the Treasury should make  annual payments into a  sinking fund,  possibly 
with  the  central  bank,  for  an  amount  corresponding  to  the  nominal 
appreciation of the principal of the outstanding stock of indexed bonds. 
The  policy  suggested  here  - financial  liberalisation  supplemented  ancl 
made  easier by  some  indexation  of  government  debt  - would  bring benefits 
not  only  to  the  Treasury,  but  probably  also  to  other borrowers.  To  the 
extent  that  they  issue  bonds,  firms  would  find  Treasury  pressures  in  the 
conventional  and  floating-rate bond  markets  somewhat  eased.  To  the extent 
that  they  have  recourse  to  bank  loans,  they  would  benefit  from  the  more 
abundant  supply  and  the  lower  rates  that  would  be  brought  about  by  the 
elimination  of  ceilings  and  other  constraints  that  now  still  exist  to 
facilitate Treasury  financing.  Furthermore·,  firms  as well as savers would 
benefit  from  having  a  more  competitive  financial  system.  This  woulcl 
stimulate  the  savings-investment  process  without  the  need  for  a 
substantially more  expansionary monetary policy at the aggregate level.  It -39-
may  be  atlO~  that  ··  savers  woulO  benefit  also  because  indexeo  instruments 
(savings  Oeposits,  insurance  policies,  etc. )  woulO  become  more  easily 
available if financial intermeOiaries were  in a  position to match them with 
indexeO  government bonOs  on their asset siOe. 
Of  course,  inOexeo  bonOs  woulo  have  to  complement,  certainly  not  to 
subsitute  for,  present  forms  of  financial  instruments  issuea  by 
goverrunents.  There  is  in  the  markets  a  considerable  aemanO  for 
diversification,  ana  inaexed bor.Os  should satisfy a  portion of this demand. 
Indeed,  diversification  might  perhaps  be  considered  even  within  inaexeCI 
bonds  themselves.  Along  with  inOexed  bonds  bearing  a  fixed  real  rate of 
interest - as  those  referred  to  so  far  a  government  may  fin~  it 
appropriate  to  issue  indexed  bonds  bearing  a  real  rate  of interest  Which 
varies  (but  in  a  predetermined  way  not  in  a  way  which  is  unspecified  ex 
ante,  as  is  the  case  for  real  rates  implicit  in  conventional  or 
floating-rate  bonds).  A  case  coulO  be  made,  in  particular,  for  indexed 
bonds  bearing  a  real  rate  of  interest  linked  to  the  real  growth  rate  of 
GOP.  This  woulO  have  stabilising properties  from  a  theoretical stanOpoint 
ana,  at  a  time  when  the  principles  of  the  "share  economy"  ~e being 
regarded with  favour,  woulO  represent  for  a  government  a  fo~ of financing 
which is the closest possible to some  concept of "equity capital". 
In  conclusion,  introducing  indexed  bonOs  in  the  array  of  government 
Oebt  instruments  may  both  make  capital-market  liberalisation  easier  ana 
reinforce  its effect of  stimUlating  the  saving-investment  process  for  any 
given monetary policy stance  ( see Appendix). 
rv.4  Financial integration 
While  Oomestic  financial  systems  are  in  the  process  of  being 
improved,  they  should  also  be  integrated  more  deeply.  Besides 
supplementing  from  the  financial  siOe  the  completion  of  the  EC  internal -40-
market,  progress  in  integration  will  reinforce  the  trend  towards  more 
efficient financial systems in member  countries,  thus contibuting to a  more 
effective savings-investment process in support of growth  and  employment. 
In fact,  financial integration may  be seen as the natural extrapolation 
of  domestic  financial  li.beralisation.  In  conanon  with  the  latter,  it  is 
based  upon  the  two  elements  of  increaseO  competition  (opening  up domestic 
financial  markets  to  international  competition)  and  decreased  recourse  to 
hidden  taxation  (in  particular of  the  form  deriving  from  restrictions  on 
capital flows ) . 
In  turn,  financial  integration  is  a  component  of  a  wider  strategy 
aiming  at creating  in  the  EC  an  area of effective  monetary  and  financial 
union.  This  wider  strategy  consists  of  the  process  leading  to  greater 
exchange  rate  stability  among  national  currencies  (monetary  integration) 
and  of the process  leading to the liberalisation of financial  services  and 
of capital  movements  (financial  integration).  While  sUbstantial  progress 
has  been  made  through  the  EMS  on  the  front  of  monetary  integration, 
advances  have  been  much  more  limited  towards  financial  integration,  Which 
is by no  means  less important  in view of supporting the savings-investment 
process in Europe. 
Yet,  present  circumstances  seem  to  be  rather  favourable  to  an 
acceleration and  deepening of financial  integration,  for two  reasons. 
First,  macroeconomic conditions denote  a  clear convergence among  member 
countries,  as  indicated  in  particular  by  the  narrowing  of  inflation 
aifferentials.  This  should  reduce  the  risks,  as  perceived  by  national 
authorities,  associated with  phasing out the  restrictions on  capital  flows 
and  other obstacles  to  financial  integration.  At  the  same  time,  there  is 
an  increasing  concern  that  market  rigiaities  bear  considerable 
responsibility  for  the  relatively  poor  performance  of the  EC  in  terms  of -41-
growth  and  employment.  This  is  gradually  inducing  national  monetary 
authorities to reduce on their part some  of the rigidities in the financial 
sphere  as  well.  They  may  even  come  to  realise  that  financial  openness 
would  put greater pressure  on  the budget  process  and  on the  labour market 
for the achievement of the adjustments that remain to be made. 
seoonCI,  those countries which have  a  longer way  to go  in the direction 
of financial  integration have  recently initiated a  liberalisation process. 
This  is  the  case  of  France  and  Italy,  which  have  recently  taken  some 
measures  of  liberalisation  in  the  field  of  foreign  exchange  controls,  as 
well  as  more  incisive  measures  reducing  the  constraints  on  the  allocation 
of  funds  through  domestic  intennediaries  and  markets.  The  two  sides  of 
this dual policy tend to reinforce  each other because,  as  less recourse  is 
made  to  financial  constraints  domestically,  the  level  and  structure  of 
domestic interest rates become  more  market-determined  an~ more  in line with 
those prevailing in international markets.  This makes  it less necessary to 
keep  restrictions  on  capital  flows,  for  any  given  balance  of payments  or 
exchange rate target. 
In  this  new  envirorunent,  the  recently . announced  EC  plan  to  achieve 
gradually  a  full  liberalisation of capital  movements  is  an  important  and 
feas:il:>le  contribution  not  only  towards  financial  integration,  but  a.1so 
towa.rc!s  the  more  general  strategy  for  growth  and  employment  advocated  in 
this report. 
The  plan32  involves  two  phases.  In  the  first  phase,  the  objective 
would  be  to  achieve  the  unconditional  and  effective  l:il:>eralisation 
throughout the Commission  of the capital operations most directly necessary 
for the appropriate functioning of the common  Market  ana  for the linkage of 
national markets  in  financial  securities.  This  implies  the  ending  of the 
exceptional arrangements  authorised  in the parts  for  some  member  countries -42-
and  an  extension  of  community  obligations  to  cover  unconditional 
liberalisation of  long  term  common  credits,  the  acquisition of listed  and 
unlisted  securities,  and  the  admission  of  securities  to  the  capital 
markets. 
The  second  phase  would  aim at achieving the complete  liberalisation of 
all  monetary  and  financial  flows  including  those  unrelatet3  to  conunon 
transactions. 
The  trend towards  liberalisation of capital move~~nts by countries such 
as  France  and  Italy may  also  make  other countries,  Germany  in particular, 
more  prepared  to  adopt  a  favourable  stance  concerning  the  development  of 
the  ECU  and  further  institutional  steps  for  the  development  of  the  EMS, 
thus  increasing  the  potential  for  a  conununity-wiCle  financial  system  with 
its own  identity.  on  the other hand,  it seems  justified that there  should 
be only limited support  for these developments  as  long  as both the  ECU  and 
the EMS  are severely eroded  in their scope by the high degree of financial 
fragmentation  still  existing  in  the  EC,  mainly  due  to  restrictions  on 
capital flows. 
Further progress  towaros  the  ~rovement of domestic  financial  systems 
and  towards  their  deeper  integration  may  of  course  imply  relevant 
transitional  costs  and  problems  for  economic  agents  as  well  as  for  the 
national  policy-makers.  However,  in  view  of  the  proXimity  of  a  capital 
constraint  for  the  European  economy,  a  general  improvement  of  Europe •  s 
financial  system  is as  important  as  appropriate  macroeconomic  policies  if 
growth  an~ employment  are to be sustained. -43-
V.  SUMMARY 
Finally it may be useful to summarise our main points,  somewhat ba1dly. 
1.  The  falls  in the price of oil and of the dollar proviCle  a  new  climate 
of  low  inflation.  It  is  now  safer  than  before  to  expanCl  the  European 
economy.  The  fall  in the  Clollar,  by  Clestroying  jobs  in  Europe •  s  exports 
inClustries,  also  makes  it  more  necessary  than  before  to  proviCle  a 
specifically European stimulus to OemanCl.  This will be even more  necessary 
if there is a  u.s.  fiscal contraction. 
2.  Europe • s  industry  is  now  working  only  slightly  below  previous  peak 
levels  of  capacity 
utilisation  possible, 
utilisation.  More 
and  employment  in 
shiftwork 
services 
might  make  higher 
is  less  limited  by 
physical capacity.  But  major  increases  in employment  will not be possible 
unless there are major expansions in capacity. 
3.  To  reduce  unemployment  to its level  in  the  late  1970s  (5  per cent  of 
the  labour  force )  output  will have  to  grow  faster  than  the  21z  per cent  a 
year  growth  currently  projecteCl.  High  growth  rates  have  occurred  in  the 
past,  especially starting  from high  unemployment,  and  they can occur again 
in  the  future.  we  must  create  the  condi  tiona  for  growth  to  builCI  up 
graClually to 5  per cent a  year for at least a  few years. 
4.  But  there  woulCl  be  a  danger  of  inflation  increasing,  anCl,  to prevent 
this,  supply-side  policies,  leading  to  low  barriers  to  entry  anCl  more 
flexibility  of  all  markets  and  incluCling  appropriate  policies  on  wage 
restraint,  are essential. 
5 .  The  extra  investment  would  be  financed  partly  from  a  reduced  trade 
surplus  (i.e.  reCluced  capital  outflows)  and  partly  by  higher  savings,  as 
consumption  lagged behinCl  the growth of income. -44-
6.  To  encourage  investment,  Europe  shoul~ relax  its tight  fiscal  policy 
an~ have a  coordinatecl monetary expansion.  The  fiscal relaxation  shoul~ be 
mainly temporary,  in order to get the economy  moving  faster.  There  shouLO 
be  time-limited  investment  incentives,  ano  also  marginal  employment 
sUbsi~ies.  PUblic employment  growth  shoul~ be mainly limiteo to programmes 
for the long-term unemployecl. 
7.  The  success of the  propose(!  expansion  ~epenOs in  large  measure  on  its 
occurring more or less simultaneously in all members of the community.  Any 
one  country that tries to  ~o it alone  (except possibly Genna.ny)  woul~ soon 
face  a  current  account  Oeficit,  to  be  financed  by  capital  imports.  If 
capital  cannot  be  attracted,  this  woult~  create  a  serious  risk  of 
Oepreciation  ano  reneweo  inflationary pressure.  But  if the  expansion  is 
simultaneous,  much  of the  negative  effect  on  the current balance  would  be 
avoiOeO  through aOditional e~rts generate(! by the expanded  imports of the 
other countries.  Whether these  consitlerations call for  some  explicit form 
of coordination is a  political issue beyond the scope of this report. 
8.  The  allocation  of  savings  to  investment  woulCI  be  more  efficient  if 
there  were  less  quantitative  regulation  Of  financial  markets. 
Liberalisation is needeCI  in' relation to capital flows  within countries ~ 
between  member  states.  Access  to  the  capital market  shoulCI  be  eas~ for 
small  fi:rms·. 
9.  Governments  should be  more  willing to  issue  inCiex-linkeo  bonds.  This 
woulCI  reduce the inflation risk both to governments  and to savers  and thus 
help to  ret~uce real interest rates. 
10.  With  the measures  outlinet~  in this  anCI  our preceding  report  it should 
be possible to make  a  major. attack on the problem of European  unemployment. -45-
APPENDIX 
Improvements in the financial system 
consiOer  a  very  simp1e  framework  for  the  analysis  of  the  financial 
market: 
s  = S(ig,  a15,  ..• ) 
+ 
io=  is + m 
D  =  S 
where  D  is  the  Oemano  for  funos,  s  is  the  supply  of  funos,  io  is  the 
expected value of the real interest rate  for borrowers,  is is the expected 
value of the  real  interest rate  for  savers,  ai0  anCl  ais  are  the  standard 
~eviations  of  the  probability  distributions  of  those  respective  real 
:interest  rates,  and  m  is  the  margin  charged  by  the  financial  system 
(intermediation cost). 
If  both  the  agents  who  oemano  and  those  who  supply  funos  are 
risk-averse (in that the  former will be prepared to bear a  higher expected 
real  cost  on  borrowings  if  the  cost  can  be  anticipated  with  greater 
certainty,  and  savers will be  content with  a  smaller  expecteO  real  return 
on  assets if that  return  is exposed  to  less inflation-risk),  the  response 
of the Oemand  ano supply of funos to changes in the arguments will be those 
inOicated by the signs. 
AS  shown  by  Figure  1,  any  policy  intervention  resulting  in  a  Oecrease 
in the spread will shift the D schedule upwards by the amount of such -46-
PIGURE  l. 
Policies reducing the cost of intermediation 
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~ecrease,  beause  any  given  borrowing  rate  will  now  be  associat~ with  a 
higher  level  of  the  rate  of  retum  to  savers  15,  shown  on  the  vertical 
axis.  There will be  an  increase in the  volume  of all funds  suppli~ and 
demanded  (from OE  to OE • )  (likely to be associated with greater savings and 
investment),  an  increase in the equilibrium rate of return to savers  ( from 
is to is'), and at the same  time a  decline in the equilibrium interest rate 
on borrowings  (because  the  increase  in  i 5,  AF,  is more  than offset by the 
decline in the spread,  AC). 
In terms of the policies discussed  in the text,  this is the case of an 
increase  in  competition,  of  a  reduction  in  the  (explicit  or  hidden) 
taxation  of  the  financial  system,  and  - at  the  EC  level  - of  greater 
integration among  domestic financial systems. 
~~e effects of  introducing  indexed  bonds  can  in turn be  considered  by 
looking  at  Figure  2.  Indexation  allows  for  a  reduction  in  the 
inflation-risk and  thus shifts both  schedules to the right.  The  volume  of 
funds  supplied  and  demanded  ( anCl  the  scale  of  the  savings-investment 
process),  will  increase  ( from  ov  to  ov• ) .  The  changes  in  real  interest 
:rates  cannot  be  Cletermined  unambiguously.  However  1  the  sma.ll~r  is  the 
elasticity  of  o  with  respect  to  the  interest  rate  and  to  its  stand~ 
deviation (as is likely to be the case  for the government sector)  1  the more 
likely is a  decrease in the real interest rate. D 
0 
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FIGURE  2 
Introduction of in~exed bon~s 
D' 
'  \ 
\ 
\ 
\ 
' 
v 
'  /  y 
~·' 
/ 
/ 
/ 
s 
/ 
/ 
/  I  ' 
~  I  ', 
'  • 
V' 
I 
I 
I 
S' 
I 
S,  D -49-
NOTES  AND  SOURCES 
l.  ·~ployment  an~  Growth  in  Europe:  A  Two-Handed  Approach",  Centre  for 
European Policy  stu~ies, Paper No.21,  1985. 
2  see,  in  particular,  the  EC  COmmission's  "Annual  Economic  Report 
1.985-86",  in European Bconomv,  No.26,  Brussels,  November  1985,  an~ the 
OECD,  Bconorrrt.c  OU~Z.OOJc,  Paris,  December  1985. 
3  EC  COmmission,  European BconaJIII,  op.  c'£~,  pp.140 et seq. 
4  see  also  ''Employment  an~  Growth  in  Europe:  A  TWo-=-Hande~  Approach", 
centre for European Policy studies,  Section III.2. 
5  EC  COnuniss ion,  European BCOTIOlllfl,  supplement B,  No. 1,  January 1986,  p.  2 
6  This  involves  assumptions  about  how  total  GOP  would  change  with 
unemployment  and  about  how  industrial  production  woul~  change  with 
total GOP.  on the latter point,  we  assume  a  unit elasticity,  assuming 
unit income elasticity of deman~ for  in~ustrial products in consumption 
plus  a  disproportionate  growth  in  investment  offset  by  negligible 
growth  in  community  exports  and  in  government  purchases  of industrial 
products.  on  the  first point,  we  base our Okun  coefficient. partly on 
Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  ~rtv  Reu'£eu,  summer  1985,  'How 
Fast can  Europe  Grow? • .  This  suggests that  for  the  recent perioo the 
Okun  coefficient is 1.. 8  for Germany  and 1.  6  for the u. K.  one may  query 
whether even coefficients of this order are  fully relevant when  one  is 
considering  a  once-for-all  expansion  of output  and  employment  (rather 
than  a  cyclical change).  In  addition  the  labour-intensity of marginal 
output  will  also  be  very  important. 
illustrative. 
The  calculations  are  therefore -50-
7  This is broadly in line with the findings of the compact model that in 
1982 the excess of labour supply over the ~urn  labour force that the 
capital stock coulC!  employ was  7.  4  per cent. 
8  The  EC  has  askeCI  firms  their  reasons  for  not  employing  more  people. 
Insufficient  p~uction  capacity  came  tenth  out  of  the  reasons 
tabulated.  ( Blu'opean BconoDIJI,  supplement B,  April 1986,  p.  8 • ) 
9  see below. 
l.O  B'rU"'pean BconDIIIfl,  supplement  B,  February l.  986,  Tables  1  anC!  3. 
l.l.  If the  coefficient  were  2,  output  growth  of  5  per  cent  a  year  would 
reduce  unemployment  by  l.. 25  points  a  year  (the  21z  'extra  •  growth, 
di  viC!ed  by 2 ) . 
1.2  BlancharC!,  o .  anC!  SUJI'Illers ,  L.  H. ,  'Hysteresis  anC!  the  European 
Unemployment  Problem' ,  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology,  mimeo, 
1.986. 
1.3  LayarC!,  R.  and  Nickell,  s.J.  1  'The  Performance  of the  British  Lalx>ur 
Market 
1 
,  LonC!on  school  of  Economics  I  centre  for  Labour  Economics, 
working Paper No. 846,  1986. 
1.4  sneessens,  H.R.  and  Dre~e, J.H.,  'A  Discussion of Belgian unemployment, 
COmbining  Traditional  concepts  and  Disequilibrium  Econometrics 
1 
I 
Bconarr£ca,  1986  forthcoming. 
1.5  At  the  European  level  general  support  for  wage  restraint  has  been 
expressed by both the offical traC!e  union  and  employers•  organisations 
TUAC  anC!  BIAC.  see  "Full  Employment  anC!  Growth  as  a  Social  ~ 
Economic  Goal  - A  Joint  statement by  BIAC  and  TUAC" 1  According  to the 
statement  "The  employment situation remains very·unsatisfactory in most 
OECD  countries,  and  recurrent  unemployment  are  specially  intolerable. 
Changing  the  present  unemployment  situation  and  achieving  full -51-
employment  through  more  investment  anC!  higher  economic  growth  shoulO 
thus be the main objective of economic and social policy." (p.3 ). 
16  see  F.  Modigliani,  Life  cycle  Hypothesis  of  saving  ano  Intercountry 
Difference  in  the  saving  Ratio",  in  The  CoZ.Z.ec'ted  Papers  of  Franco 
Jl:)df.gZ.tmr£:  The  L"£fe  CJicl.e  BJ/potlles1,s  of Sav"£ng,  Vol.2  (ed..  A.  Abel), 
Massachusetts  Institute of Technology  Press:  CambriC!ge,  Massachusetts, 
1980,  pp.382-412.  A  1  per cent increase  in the trend growth of income 
is  found to increase the saving ratio between  11z  and  2  per cent.  In a 
later paper  "Determinants  of Private  saving  with  special  Reference  to 
the  Role  of  social  security  cross  country  Tests"  (with 
Arlie sterling), it is founo that the effect of pure_productivity rise, 
Which  may  be  expected to be  a  large  component of the aovocated  growth, 
is even larger,  between  2  anO  3  per cent. 
17  EUropean EConomy,  November  1985,  pp.l83 and  134. 
18  EUropean EConomy,  November  1985,  pp.166 and 134. 
19  The  fact that the  share of the budget Oeficit in GNP  is still the  same 
as  in  1979  is  irrelevant.  This  is  due  mainly  to higher  payments  to 
unemployed  workers  (Which  respond passively to unemployment  ~d Oo  not 
explain its level) and to higher interest payments  (Whose  Oema.no  impact 
is  small,  especially  to  the  extent  that  they  reflect  nominal  rather 
than real interest). 
20  In the short-run there is no conflict between pursuing increased use of 
labOur  and of capital.  This is clear even  in a  strictly noe-classical 
framework.  In this  caSe,  employment  is determine(!  by  capital  anO  the 
real cost of labour: 
( f'  < 0) -52-
where N is employment,  K capital, W/P  the real wage  ancs  t  labour taxes. 
In  a~~ition,  capital  growth  is  detennin~ by  the  rate  of  retum  on 
capital,  p(NfK),  relative to the cost of capital (c) 
(g'  )  0;  p'  )  0) 
so  for any given path of WfP,  the path of N will be higher the lower t 
an~ the lower c. 
21  EC  COmmission  ''Annual  Economic  Review,  1985/86  ",  European  BconotiQI 
No.26,  November 1985,  Chapter 3. 
22  Document  EC  II-107/85. 
23  In  a  stuCSy  based  on  a  simulation model,  Gerken  e~  a~.  suggest that  an 
overall  reduction  of  sUbsidies  by  so  per  cent  over  a  period  of  five 
years,  combined  with  corresponding  cuts,  could  increase  the  number  of 
jobs  in West  Germany  by .1  million.  Gerken  et al.  'Mehr Arbeitsplaetze 
ourch Subventionsabbau',  Kiel University,  Discussion Paper No.  113/114, 
1985. 
24  "Employment  and  Growth  in  Europe:  A  Two-BanCSed  Approach",  centre  for 
European Policy studies Paper,  No.21,  1985. 
25  EC  COmmission,  "Annual  Economic  Report  1985-86:  A  cooperative  Growth 
strategy  for  More  Employment"  ancs  "Annual  Economic  Review",  Bu.ropean 
Beonomv,  No.26,  November  1985. 
26  Weiss,  F .o.  anCS  Giersch,  H.,  "Internal and  External Li.beralisation ancs 
the European Economies'  structural Development",  May  1985. 
27  This  analysis has  been  carried out  in detail,  for  example  in the case 
of  Italy  ("Report  on  the  Italian credit  anti  Financial  system", . Ba.nca 
Nazionale del La.voro,  Quarur~v Rev'£eLJ,  Special Issue,  June  1983 ) . -53-
28  consi~er,  for  example,  that  since  1963  fewer  than  600  companies  have 
been  list~ on the second tier of exchanges in the EC,  while during the 
ten years  from  1974  to  1984  the  nationwiOe  electronic Oealing  network 
in the u.s.  has  created  an  active market of s,ooo  list~ equities with 
an  annual  trading  volume  of  S153  billion  - bigger  than  the  combined 
volume  of business  on  the  stock  exchanges  of Britain,  Germany,  France, 
Italy and  the  Netherlands.  While  the  EC  countries produce  as many  new 
start-ups  in  a  year  as  the  u.s.,  about  600,000,  no  large-scale 
mechanism exists  for  tra~ing the equity of these  companies.  Partly as 
a  consequence  of  this  situation,  European  investors  have  proviO~ 
American  venture  companies  with  a  fifth  of  their  capital  in  recent 
years.  In  1985  alone,  Europeans  provid~  more  than  $600  mill.ion 
tow~s  the  $3.2  billion  rais~  ~n  venture  capital  in  the  u.s. 
( .BU.l"Cmmnev,  February 1986 ) • 
29  A  discussion  of  this  issue,  inclu~ing  references  to  the  British 
experience,  is  in  M.  MOnti  "Indexation  of  Government  Debt  - anCl  its 
Alternatives",  forthcoming  in  B.P.  Herber,  ed.,  Publ.tc  F£nance  and 
Pllb1.'£c  DeZ,-t,  International  Institute  of  Public  Finance,  wayne·  state 
University Press. 
30  It can be  noteO,  however that a  company  may  not  avoi~ risks associateCl 
with relative prices even when  issuing nominal debt instruments. 
31  see,  for  example,  N.  Liviatan,  "On  the  Interaction  between  wage  an~ 
Asset  Indexation",  in R.  oornJ:>usch  an~ M.H.  Simonsen,  eds.,  Infl.c-ti.on, 
Deb't  and  IndeZG't~,  cambri~ge,  Massachusetts,  Massachusetts  Institute 
of Technology Press,  1983. 
32  The  plan,  announced  by  President Delors on  May  12,  1986,  is outlined in 
the Communication  from  the  Commission to the Council of May  23,  1986, 
"Proqramme  for  the Liberalization of Capital Movements  in the Community" -54-
Economic  Papers 
The  following  papers  have  been  jssued.  Copies  may  be  obtained 
by  applying  to  the  address  mentioned  on  the  inside  front  cover. 
No.  1 
No.  3 
No.  4 
No.  5 
No.  6 
No.  7 
No.  8 
No.  9 
No.  10 
No.  11 
No.  12 
No.  13 
EEC-DG  II  inflationary expectations.  Survey  based  inflationa~y 
expectations  for  the  EEC  countries,  by  F.  Papadia  and  V.  Basano 
<May  1981). 
A review  of  the  informal  economy  in  the  European  Community,  by 
Adrian  Smith  (July  1981). 
Problems  of  interdependence  in  a  multipolar  world,  by 
Tommaso  Padoa-Schioppa  <August  1983). 
European  Di'mensions  in  the  Adjustment  Problems,  by  Michael  Emerson 
<August  1981). 
The  bilateral  trade  linkages  of  the  Eurolink  Model  :  An  analysis 
of  foreign  trade  and  competitiveness,  by  P.  Ranuzzi  (January  1982>. 
United  Kingdom,  Medium  term  economic  trends  and  problems,  by 
D.  Adams,  s.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  Wortmann  (February  1982). 
Ou  en  est  La  theorie  macroeconomique,  par  E.  Malinvaud  Cjuin  1982>. 
Marginal  Employment  Subsidies  :  An  Effective  Policy  to  Generate 
Employment,  by  Carl  Chiarella  and  Alfred  Steinherr  (November  1982>. 
The  Great  Depression  :  A Repeat  in  the  1980s  ?,  by  Alfred  Steinherr 
(November  1982). 
Evolution  et  problemes  structurels  de  l'economie  neerlandaise, 
par  D.C.  Breedveld,  C.  Depoortere,  A.  Finetti,  Dr.  J.M.G.  Pieters 
et  C.  Vanbelle  <mars  1983~. 
Macroeconomic  prospects  and  policies  for  the  European  Community, 
by  Giorgio  Basevi,  Olivier  Blanchard,  Willem  Suiter, 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  and  Richard  Layard  (April  1983). 
The  supply  of  output  equations  in the  EC-countries  and  the  use  of 
the  survey-based  inflationary expectations,  by  Paul  De  Grauwe  and 
Mustapha  Nabl i  (May  1983). -55-
No.  14  Structural  trehds  of  financial  systems  and  capital  accumulation 
France,  Germany,  Italy,  by  G.  Nardozzi  <May  1983). 
No.  15  Monetary  asse~s and  inflation  induced  distortions  of  the  national 
..., 
accounts  - conceptual  i~sues .and  c6rrection of  sectoral  income  flows 
in  5  EEC  countries,  by  Alex  Cukierman  and  Jorgen  Mortensen  <May  1983). 
No.  16  Federal  Republic  of  Germany.  Medium-term  economic  trends  and 
problems,  by  F.  Allgayer,  S.  Gillespie,  M.  Green  and  H.  Wortmann 
(June  1983). 
No.  17  The  employment  miracle  in  the  US  and  stagnation employment  in 
the  EC,  by  M.  Wegner  (July  1983). 
No.  18  Productive  Performance  in  West  German  Manufacturin~ Industry 
1970-1980;  A Farrell  Frontier Characterisation,  by  D.  Todd 
(August  1983). 
No.  19  Central-Bank  Policy  and  the  Financing  of  Government  Budget  Deficits 
A Cross-Country  Comparison,  by  G.  Demopoulos,  G.  Katsimbris  and 
S.  Miller  <September  1983). 
No.  20  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced  distortions of  the  national 
accounts.  The  case  of  Belgium,  by  Ken  Lennan  <October  1983>. 
No.  21  Actifs  financiers  et  distorsions  des  flux  sectoriels dues  a 
L'inflation  :  le  cas  de  La  France,  par  J.-P.  Bache  Coctobre  1983>. 
No.  22  Approche  pragmatique  pour  une  politique de  plein  emploi  :  les 
subventions a  La  creation d'emplois,  par  A.  Steinherr et 
B.  van  Haeperen  Coctobre  1983). 
No.  23  Income  Distribution  and  Employment  in  the  European  Communities 
1960- 1982,  by  A.  Steinherr  (December  1983). 
No.  24  U.S.  Deficits,  the  dollar  and  Europe,  by  0.  Blanchard  and 
R.  Dornbusch  (December  1983). 
No.  25  Monetary  assets  and  inflation  induced  distortions  of  the  national 
accounts..  The  ca-se  of  the  Federal  Republic  of  Germany,  by 
H.  Wittelsberger  (January  1984), 
No.  26  Actifs  financiers  et  distorsions  des  flux  sectoriels dues  a 
l'inflation:  le  cas  de  l'ltalie, par  A.  Reati  (janvier 1984>. 
No.  27  Evolution  et  problemes  strucurels  de  l'economie  italienne,  par 
Q.  Ciardelli,  F.  Colasanti  et  X.  Lannes  (janvier  1984>. 
No.  28  International  Co-operation. in  Macro-economic  Policies,  by 
J.E.  Meade  <February  1984>. -56-
No.  29  The  Growth  of  Public  Expenditure  in the  EEC  Countries  1960-1981 
Some  Reflections,  by  Douglas  Todd  (December  1983>. 
No.  30  The  integration of  EEC  qualitative  consumer  survey  results  in 
econometric  modelling  :  an  application  to  the  consumption  function, 
by  Peter  Praet  <February  1984>. 
No.  31  Report  of  the  CEPS  Mac~oeconomic Policy  Group.  EUROPE  :  The  case 
for  unsustainable  growth,  by  R.  Layard,  G.  Basevi,  0.  Blanchard, 
w.  Suiter  and  R.  Dornbusch  (April  1984>. 
No.  32  Total  Factor  Productivity  Growth  and  the  Productivity  Slowdown  in 
the  West  German  Industrial  Sector,  1'970-1981,  by  Douglas  Todd  (April  1984>. 
No.  33  An  Analytical  Form~lation and  Evaluation of  the  Existing  Structure of 
Legal  Reserve  Requirements  of  the  Greek  Economy  :  An  Uncommon  Case, 
by  G.  Demopoulos  (June  1984>. 
No.  34  Factor  Productivity  Growth  in  Four  EEC  Countries,  1960-1981  by 
Douglas  Todd  <October  1984>. 
No.  35  Rate  of  profit,  business  cycles  and  capital  accumulation  in 
U.K.  industry, -1959-1981,  by  Angelo  Reati  (November  1984). 
No.  36  Report  of  the  CEPS  Macroeconomic  Policy  Group.  Employment  and  Growth 
in  Europe  :  A Two-Handed  Approach  by  P.  Blanchard,  R.  Dornbusch, 
J.  Dreze,  H.  Giersch,  R.  Layard  and  M.  Monti  (June  1985). 
No.  37  Schemas  for  the  construction  of  an  "auxiliary econometric  model" 
for  the  social  security  system  by  A.  Coppini  and  G.  Laina  (June  1985). 
No.  38  Seasonal  and  Cyclical  Variations  in  Relationship  among  Expectations, 
Plans  and  Realizations  in Business  Test  Surveys  by  H.  Konig  and 
M.  Nerlove  (July  1985). 
No.  39  Analysis  of  the  stabilisati-on mechanisms  of  macroeconomic  models  : 
a  comparison  of  the  Eurolink  models  by  A.  Bucher  and  V.  Rossi  (July  1985>. 
No.  40  Rate  of  profit,  business  cycles  and  capital  accumulation  in 
West  German  industry,  1960-1981  by  A.  Reati  (July  1985). 
·No.  41  Inflation  induced  redistributions  via  monetary  assets  in 
five  European  countries_:  1974-1982  by  A.  Cukierman,  K.  Lennan 
-and  F.  Papadia  <September  19.85>. 
No.  42  Work  Sharing  :  Why?  How?  How  not  •••  by  Jacques  H.  Dreze 
(December  1985). 
No.  43  Toward  Understanding  Major  Fluctuations of the  Dollar  by  P.  Armington 
(January  1986) -57-
No.  44  Predictive value of  firms'  manpower  expectations and  policy 
implications  by  G.  Nerb  <March  1986). 
No.  45  Le  taux  de  profit et  ses  composantes  dans  l'industrie  fran~aise de 
1959  a 1981  par  Angelo  Reati  (Mars  1986). 
No.  46  Forecasting aggregate  demand  components  with  opinions  surveys·  in the 
four  main  EC-Countries  - Experience  with  the  BUSY  model  by  M.  Biart 
and  P.  Praet  <May  1986). 
No.  47  Report  of  the  CEPS  Macroeconomic  Policy  Group  :  Reducing  Unemployment 
in  Europe  :  The  Role  of  ~apital  Formation  by  F.  Modigliani,  M.  Monti, 
J.  Dreze,  H.  Giersch,  R.  Layard  {July 1986). 